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A TALE OF CONFLICTING SOVEREIGNTIES: THE CASE
AGAINST TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION DOCTRINES PREVENTING STATES'
ENFORCEMENT OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION
REGULATIONS ON INDIAN TRIBES
Paul Porter*
This Note will discuss whether Indian tribes can assert tribal sovereign immunity
to avoid compliance with state campaign finance regulation and whether such
regulations should be preempted by federal law. Tribal sovereign immunity is not
an enshrined constitutional imperative; it exists only under federal common law,
and can be limited by the courts from blocking state suits to enforce campaign fi-
nance regulations against tribes. This Note will also argue that state campaign
finance regulations should not be preempted by federal law because states have a
compelling interest in protecting their political processes from corruption that out-
weighs tribal interests in flouting the laws. States also enjoy rights arising from the
text of the U.S. Constitution under the Tenth Amendment and the Guaranty
Clause, which courts should recognize to permit states to regulate tribes in the con-
text of state campaign finance laws.
INTRODUCTION
Two powerful constitutional tools enable Indian tribes to un-
dermine the fairness of state election campaigns. First, tribes enjoy
broad immunity from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity, which prohibits state governments and private actors
from bringing cases against tribes and their members without a
waiver by the tribe or the consent of Congress.' Second, federal
preemption bars states from enforcing regulations governing af-
fairs on Indian tribal lands.! Tribal sovereign immunity and federal
preemption can be mere inconveniences for states wishing to levy
taxes on tribal enterprises or hold tribes liable in contract and tort
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2006; University of Texas at Ar-
lington, B.S.E.E. 1996, M.S.E.E. 1998. The author would like to thank his editor, Jeffrey
Jacobi, for all the good advice, and his wife, Keiko, for her loving support during law school.
1. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); see also Long v. Cheme-
huevi Indian Reservation, 171 Cal. Rptr. 733, 734 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting that tribes cannot
be sued without the consent of Congress).
2. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
3. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
505 (1991) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity prohibits states from collecting taxes on
tobacco sales to tribal members); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334,
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suitS.
4 These doctrines, however, are more problematic for states
trying to run fair elections.
State legislatures may pass statutes that mandate public disclo-
sure of private contributions to state candidates for political office
to promote fairness and transparency in state election campaigns!
The efficacy of such regulations is diminished if state governments
cannot enforce the regulations against tribal contributors who are
shielded by sovereign immunity and federal preemption. States'
inability to enforce campaign disclosure laws undermines the fair-
ness of election campaigns, particularly when tribes can make
substantial contributions to state candidates and influence, inter
alia, state budget allocations. 6
This Note argues that tribal sovereign immunity and federal
preemption should not justify tribes' failure to comply with state
campaign disclosure statues. Part I describes the legal history of
tribal sovereign immunity regarding campaign finance laws. Part II
argues that tribal sovereign immunity is not a constitutional im-
perative, but merely a creature of common law that has outlived its
purpose and has dubious origins.7 Part II ultimately recommends
that tribal sovereign immunity should be strictly limited when it
does not bear a sufficient nexus to a tribe's sovereign functions.
Part III discusses why federal preemption should not prevent state
enforcement of campaign contribution laws against tribes. Finally,
Part IV argues that states enjoy rights under the Guaranty Clause
and the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution that should
allow them to enforce contribution disclosure statutes against
tribes, especially because the text of the Constitution does not
guarantee tribes any rights whatsoever.
343-44 (1983) (holding that federal preemption prevents enforcement of state hunting
quotas against non-Indians hunting game on tribal lands).
4. See, e.g., Long, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 735-36 (holding that tribal sovereign immunity
barred wrongful death action against a tribally-owned marina).
5. E.g., The California Political Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GOVT CODE § 82013 (West
2006).
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that common law is subject to change by courts to
reflect the experience of society: "It is something to show that the consistency of a system
requires a particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1981).
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I. HISTORY OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
THE CONTEXT OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATIONS
A. The Origins of the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty and the Supreme
Court's Renewed Interest in State Sovereignty
The judicial doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity was first
promulgated by Chief Justice John Marshall of the Supreme Court
in the Cherokee Cases." In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Cherokee
Nation filed suit in the Supreme Court to prevent the State of
Georgia from breaking up Cherokee lands and merging them into
Georgian counties. 9 The tribe's case depended on the Court re-
garding the tribe as a "foreign state," as required under the
Constitution for the Supreme Court to have jurisdiction over the
to
case.
Justice Marshall ruled that although Indian tribes could be con-
sidered "states," the tribes were something less than foreign
nations." This holding denied the tribe sovereign statehood and
hence direct access to the Supreme Court, but it laid the founda-
tion for the Court to rule in favor of the tribe just a few years later.
In Worcester v. Georgia, two missionaries appealed their criminal
convictions under Georgia law for residing on Cherokee lands
without obtaining a license from the state governor. 2 After review-
ing the historical course of dealing and the relevant treaties,Justice
Marshall concluded that, "[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a dis-
tinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
orce. .. ,13
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 538 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
9. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15.
10. Id. at 16; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (reserving original jurisdiction in the Su-
preme Court for cases in which "States" are a party). Thus, if the Supreme Court had
determined that the Cherokee Nation were a State, then the Supreme Court would have
had jurisdiction to hear the case.
11. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("They may, more correctly, perhaps, be de-
nominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right to
possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.").
12. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 537.
13. Id. at 561 (emphasis added).
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These cases were significant because they assured that states
could not assert jurisdiction on tribal lands. 4 This premise still
holds, but the Supreme Court now recognizes limitations on this
doctrine. 15
Since the Cherokee Cases, congressional policy towards Indians has
vacillated between tribal termination and fostering tribal self-
determination. 16 In the latter half of the twentieth century, con-
gressional policy began to acknowledge tribal autonomy. For
example, President Richard Nixon acknowledged to the Congress
in 1970 that prior Indian policies had failed. 17 He encouraged a
trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes'
and urged Congress to pass legislation to allow tribes to manage
their own affairs with a maximum degree of autonomy.'9 Other
commentators also began to argue that state regulation in Indian
country could thwart the economic progress of Indian tribes be-
fore that progress started to gain momentum. 2 Consequently,
today federal policy favors providing for tribal self-sufficiency,
2 '
and tribes are indeed making great strides in economic develop-
ment.
2 2
While the federal government has limited state activities that
might encroach on tribal self-sufficiency-such as state efforts to
assert taxes or regulations in Indian country 2 3-the Supreme Court
has expanded the power of states.2 4 Although the Constitution
14. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *2-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003).
15. For example, Public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1161-62 (1994), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22 (2004), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2003)), granted
criminal and civil jurisdiction for disputes arising in Indian country to California, Nebraska,
Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. This grant of jurisdiction permits states to hear cases
arising in contract and tort on Indian lands, but is not a blank check giving states a general
regulatory power over Indian country. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 387-89 (1976).
16. See, e.g., COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw §§ 1.04, 5.04 & 22.03[1] [a]
n.168 (NellJ. Newton et al. eds., 2005).
17. 116 CONG. REC. 17, 23258 (1970).
18. "One of the basic principles in Indian law is that the federal government has a trust or
special relationship with Indian tribes. Courts have invoked the language of guardian and
ward, or more recently trustee and beneficiary." COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW, supra note 16, § 5.04.
19. Id.
20. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 341 (1983).
21. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 17, 23258 (1970).
22. For example, in 1987, the Chickasaw Nation had a budget of $11 million and 200
employees. By 2005, through gaming, banking and various other enterprises, the Chickasaw
budget had increased to $300 million and over 7,000 employees. Email from Robyn Elliot,
Administrator, Division of Communications, The Chickasaw Nation (Aug. 31, 2005) (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
23. See discussion of preemption infra Part III.A.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18, 627 (2000) (holding Vio-
lence Against Women Act unconstitutional due to insufficient nexus with interstate
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nominally permits Congress only to regulate commerce between
the states,25 since the New Deal era, the Supreme Court has defined
"commerce" very broadly, 2 effectively allocating considerable
power to the federal government under the Commerce Clause to
impose regulation in the states.
However, a recent string of Supreme Court opinions has resur-
rected the sovereignty of the states by limiting Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. In United States
211v. Lopez2 s and United States v. Morrison, congressional power to pass
regulations on the states was checked by the Supreme Court. These
cases are evidence of the Court's recent retreat from the seemingly
limitless power of the federal government under the Commerce
Clause. The Court may be redefining the balance of federalism to
provide more sovereignty to the states.0 This trend in Supreme
Court jurisprudence of limiting federal encroachment on state
sovereignty leads to a tension with present congressional policy to-
wards empowering tribes, as discussed in the next section.
B. The Clash of State Sovereignty and Tribal Sovereignty: Agua Caliente
Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court
Tribal sovereign immunity and state sovereignty recently clashed
in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court,3' a case
recently heard by the California Court of Appeals. The Fair Politi-
commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 561 (1995) (striking down the na-
tional Gun Free School Zone Act as unconstitutional and holding that the Act exceeded the
bounds of the Commerce Clause).
25. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
26. For example, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114, 125-26 (1941), the Court
dramatically expanded the federal government's ability to regulate activities taking place
entirely within state borders by taking an expansive view of what interstate commerce is, and
allowing for establishment of a national minimum wage. The Court reasoned that, so long as
the activity that Congress seeks to regulate bears a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce, it
falls within Congress' Commerce Clause powers. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
124-29 (1942) (upholding a federal agricultural quota tinder the aggregate theory of the
Commerce Clause).
27. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; see also Ambre Howard, Current
Events: United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 9 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'v & L. 461, 467
(2001); Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 895, 895 (1996).
28. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. In the Court's view, there simply was not a sufficient nexus be-
tween possession of a gun near a school and interstate commerce. Id. at 560.
29. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
30. See William H. Pryor, Jr., Madison's Double Security: In Defense of Federalism, the Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1167, 1167,1173 (2002).
31. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004).
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cal Practices Commission (FPPC), a California state agency created
to enforce California's Political Reform Act of 1974 (PRA),32
brought suit in the Superior Court of the State of California to
compel the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians' compliance
with the PRA. California's PRA was established in the wake of the
Watergate scandal and the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v.
Valeo, s which upheld the constitutionality of a federal campaign
contribution disclosure law.34
The PRA codifies the policy promulgated in Buckley.35 The Cali-
fornia state legislature's findings state that:
(a) State and local government should serve the needs
and respond to the wishes of all citizens equally,
without regard to their wealth;
(b) Public officials, whether elected or appointed,
should perform their duties in an impartial manner,
free from bias caused by their own financial inter-
ests or the financial interests of persons who have
supported them... ;
(f) The wealthy individuals and organizations which
make large campaign contributions frequently ex-
tend their influence by employing lobbyists and
spending large amounts to influence legislative and
administrative actions;
(g) The influence of large campaign contributors in
ballot measure elections is increased because the
ballot pamphlet mailed to the voters by the state is
difficult to read and almost impossible for a layman
to understand. 36
32. The California Political Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 82013 (West
2006). See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *2-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003).
33. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
34. Id. at 60-84. The Court noted that such a law served important government inter-
ests in "the 'free functioning of our national institutions,"' id. at 66 (quoting Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961)), and that the sources of a
candidate's funding "alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be
responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office." Id. at 67. The
Court also noted that the disclosure requirements reduced both actual corruption and the
appearance of corruption, and that reporting requirements "are an essential means of gath-
ering the data necessary to detect violations of... contribution limitations." Id. at 68. Buckley
was an important decision because it provided specific approval for states to pass their own
campaign disclosure laws, like the PRA. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 2003 WL 733094, at
*5-6.
35. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 2003 WL 733094 at *5-6.
36. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81001 (West 2006).
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The PRA requires disclosure of lobbying activities to prevent
lobbyists from exerting improper influence on public officials.s7
The statute mandates disclosures by specified elected officers, can-
didates, and "committees." The definition of "committee"
includes "any person or combination of persons who directly or
indirectly...
(b) Makes independent expenditures totaling one
thousand dollars ($1,000) or more in a calendar
year; or
(c) Makes contributions totaling ten thousand dollars
($10,000) or more in a calendar year to or at the
behest of candidates or committees.
'3
9
The FPPC alleged that the Agua Caliente tribe donated millions
of dollars to fund over 140 political candidates and to fund state
ballot initiatives since 1998.4° It further alleged that the tribe failed
to disclose large contributions to ballot initiatives directed towards
building a rail line that would stop at the tribe's Coachella Valley
Casino. 4' Had the rail project passed, it would have cost California
taxpayers over a billion dollars. Additionally, the FPPC alleged
that the tribe failed to disclose multi-million dollar donations to a
43number of other ballot measures.
The FPPC filed suit against the Agua Caliente tribe in 2002 to
enforce its disclosure requirements under the PRA in Sacramento
County Superior Court.44 The tribe moved to quash service of
summons and to dismiss the action under the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity from suit.45 The court denied the motion, stat-
ing that Supreme Court precedents only permit tribal immunity in
"suits arising from the governmental as well as economic activities
of a tribe within and outside of tribal territory,"46 and that no
37. Id. §§ 81002, 86116.
38. Id. § 86116; see also id. § 82047 (defining the term "person" tinder the act to in-
clude "committees"); id. § 82013(c) (defining a "committee" to be a group of persons acting
in concert and making contributions totaling more than ten thousand dollars in a given
year).
39. Id. § 82013.
40. Real Party in Interest's Opposition Brief on the Merits at 5-6, Agua Caliente Band




44. Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003).
45. Id.
46. Id. at *5.
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decision had ever suggested immunity could be asserted when a
tribe attempts to participate in a state's political system.47 The court
also held that even if immunity were extended to suits from the
PRA, such immunity would impermissibly interfere with Califor-
nia's rights under the Tenth Amendment and the Guaranty Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees California a republican
form of government and reserves for California the right to govern
its own elections.8
The tribe appealed to the California Court of Appeals,49 arguing
that the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit was a constitutional
imperative. The appeals court noted that the tribe could point to
no authority for that proposition.50 The appeals court additionally
opined that "[s]tates may regulate within Indian country only
when state control is not preempted by federal law or when state
control does not infringe on tribal sovereignty.,'5
The appeals court concluded that the doctrine of tribal sover-
eign immunity was not a constitutional imperative as the tribe
claimed. 2 Noting that the Constitution mentions Indians only in
the Indian Commerce Clause and the power of the executive to
make treaties, the court concluded that tribal sovereign immunity
is merely a creature of common law.53 Like the trial court, the ap-
pellate court upheld the Tenth Amendment and the Guaranty
Clause as a limitation on tribal immunity in any case where the
tribe sought to flout FPPC requirements.
5 4
The tribe appealed the case to the California Supreme Court.
Because this case is one of first impression,56 and because there are
far-reaching constitutional ramifications regarding a conflict be-
tween states' rights and tribal sovereignty, this case is likely to reach
the Supreme Court of the United States. Part II of this Note ex-
plains why courts should hold that tribal sovereign immunity is not
a constitutional imperative and recommends against application of
the doctrine where tribes seek to avoid compliance with state cam-
paign finance regulations.
47. Id.
48. Id. at *6.
49. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004).
50. Id. at 684-85.
51. Id. at 686.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 687-88.
55. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 92 P.3d 310 (Cal. 2004).
56. Fair Political Practices Commn'n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No.
02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 2003).
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II. TRIBAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT Is NOT A
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE
A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity Originated
from Federal Common Law
If the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity were found in the
U.S. Constitution or in any act of Congress, it would have powerful
binding effect on the states. However, tribal sovereign immunity
cannot be found in the text of the Constitution or in any congres-
sional act.'7 Tribal sovereign immunity is entirely created by federal
common law!"
This Part argues that federal common law is not a constitutional
imperative because it is court-created law that merely fills gaps left
by the Constitution or by federal statutes. Tribal sovereign immu-
nity is merely federal common law because it is created by neither
Congress nor the Constitution. Courts should strictly limit the doc-
trine of tribal sovereign immunity in the case of statutes like the
PRA because tribal sovereign immunity has outlived its purpose.
Also, statutes like the PRA place minimal burdens on tribes and do
not interfere with tribes' sovereign functions.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provided the best
definition of "federal common law" in United States v. Enas.'9 In
Enas, the court lamented that the term "federal common law" has
"eluded precise definition," and sought guidance from secondary
sources.' One source defined federal common law as "the devel-
opment of legally binding federal law by the federal courts in the
absence of directly controlling constitutional or statutory provisions.""' An-
other source defined federal common law as "any rule of federal
law created by a court ... when the substance of that rule is not
clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional.,6
2
Tribal sovereign immunity is merely a federal "common-law im-
munity from suit."63 Recently, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested
that "the time has come to reexamine the premises and logic of
57. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 684-85.
58. Id. at 687.
59. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 349 (3d ed. 1999))
(emphasis added).
62. Id. (quoting Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 881, 890 (1986)).
63. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (emphasis added).
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our tribal sovereignty cases."" 4justice John Paul Stevens, joined by
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Thomas, opined that while it is
"too late to repudiate the doctrine [of tribal sovereign immunity]
entirely," it should not be extended "beyond its present con-
tours. 5
Those "contours" of tribal sovereign immunity were last set by
66the Court in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., a case
that serves as a roadmap to the origins of tribal sovereign immu-
nity. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that
the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is supported by "but a
slender reed."6 7 justice Kennedy began his opinion by recounting
the development of the doctrine. He noted that tribal sovereign
immunity came about "almost by accident,"6 and that the Court's
decisions recognize that the doctrine was "founded upon an
anachronistic fiction," because the very root of the doctrine was
derived from the Court's decision in Turner v. United States'-a case
that did not even turn on tribal sovereignty."7
Justice Kennedy went on to recount how the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity was solidified in the Court's decision in United
States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty (USF&G) .72 USF&G-citing
64. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (Thomas,J., concurring).
65. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 764 (1998) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 754. In that case, the Kiowa Tribe entered into a contract with Manufacturing
Technologies to purchase shares in an aviation firm. Id. at 753. There was disagreement
amongst the parties as to whether the contract was executed on tribal land. Id. at 753-54.
The contract did not specify governing law, but contained a clause disclaiming any limita-
tion on the "sovereign rights of the Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma." Id. at 754. When the tribe
defaulted on the payment, Manufacturing Technologies brought suit, and the tribe asserted
immunity. Id. The lower courts ruled in favor of the tribe, and Manufacturing Technologies
asked the Supreme Court to rule that tribes could be subject to suit for off-reservation
commercial conduct. Id.
67. Id. at 757.
68. id. at 756.
69. Id. at 758 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe,
498 U.S. 505, 514-15 (Stevens,J., concurring).
70. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
71. Kioiva Tribe, 523 U.S. at 757. The Turner case involved a non-Indian lessee of Indian
lands, who used the lands for grazing. Turner built a fence around the land, which was sub-
sequently torn down by an Indian mob. In upholding the dismissal of the suit, Justice
Brandeis wrote, "The fundamental obstacle to recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit,
but the lack of a substantive right to recover damages resulting from the failure of a gov-
ernment or its officers to keep the peace." Turner, 248 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added).Justice
Brandeis' mention of sovereign immunity was rhetorical, assuming its existence without any
analysis or otherwise citing any authority. Yet, Turner is the case upon which the doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity is built. HenceJustice Kennedy's opinion that Turneris a "slender
reed."
72. United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) [hereinafter USF&G]. In
this case, the United States leased certain coal lands on behalf of the Chickasaw and Choc-
taw nations with the USF&G Company acting as a guarantor for royalties owed to the tribes.
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Turner-held that "Indian Nations are exempt from suit without
Congressional authorization, and according to Justice Kennedy,
the Court has upheld the USF&G doctrine in subsequent cases
"with little analysis."74
Having traced the common law history of tribal sovereign im-
munity, and having concluded that "[t]here are reasons to doubt
the wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine,"75justice Kennedy de-
cided to defer to Congress, which to him meant extending the
contours of tribal sovereign immunity to include cases arising from
tribal commercial activities occurring on or off reservation lands.
7'
He suggested that Congress, or impliedly the Court, may shape
tribal sovereign immunity, subject to constitutional limitations." In
other words, neither the Court nor Congress is under any constitu-
tional compulsion to perpetuate the doctrine. Rather, both are
merely limited by the Constitution.
In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, the
Agua Caliente tribe argues that tribal immunity from suit is a con-
stitutional imperative by virtue of Congress' plenary powers over
Indian affairs, but the tribe has not cited any authority in support
of that proposition. In fact, once created, common law doctrines
such as tribal immunity can be overturned by Congressional act,
7
9
so it is incorrect that any doctrine created by federal common law
rises to the level of irreproachable constitutional order .8 Congress
Id. at 510. When the lessee filed for bankruptcy, the United States, still acting on behalf of
the tribes, brought suit against the lessee in federal district court in Missouri. Id. The lessee
made counterclaims against the tribes, which resulted in a net judgment to the lessee. Id.
The United States then filed suit in federal district court in the Eastern District of Oklahoma
seeking remuneration from USF&G. Id. The USF&G claimed that the Missouri judgment
was a bar to recovery. Id. at 511. The district and appeals courts both found for USF&G, but
the Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Missouri judgment was "void in so far as it
[undertook] to fix a credit against the Indian Nations." Id. at 512.
73. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 757 (quoting USF&G, 309 U.S. at 512 (citing Turner, 248
U.S. at 358)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 758.
76. Id. at 760.
77. Id. at 759.
78. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 684
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004). The Indian Commerce Clause cannot support their argument, because
it grants a power to Congress only, and because campaign finance regulations are not about
commerce, but politics. Id. at 686. Neither will the Treaty Clause work to support their case,
because the Agua Caliente tribe has no treaty with the United States. Id.; see U.S. CONrST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress authority to regulate commerce with Indian tribes); U.S. CONST.
art. il, § 2, cl. 2 (conferring on the President the power to enter into treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate).
79. United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2001).
80. See id.
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has the power to overturn federal common law doctrines relating
to Indian tribes.8'
Because tribal sovereign immunity is merely federal common
law built upon a "slender reed, '8 2 it is not subject to "the all-or-
nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification instead of
an evolving boundary between the domains of old principles." 3
Rather, federal common law "tends to pay respect ... to detail,
seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples and
new counterexamples.", 4 Therefore, courts are at liberty to decide
the contours of tribal sovereign immunity and whether the con-
tours of tribal sovereign immunity should continue to protect
tribal attempts to circumvent state election regulations.
B. Reasons to Limit the "Contours" of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Courts should limit the contours of tribal sovereign immunity
because allowing it to block enforcement of statutes like the PRA is
contrary to the doctrine's purpose, which is to protect tribes from
encroachment by states."" Also, using tribal sovereign immunity to
block enforcement of statutes like the PRA is fundamentally unfair
because it requires courts to allow an injustice on a sovereign state.
Finally, tribal sovereign immunity does not apply when state en-
croachments are not burdensome, and requiring tribes to comply
with state campaign finance laws is not too burdensome to justify
application of tribal sovereign immunity to statutes like the PRA.
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has exceeded its pur-
pose.86 In a previous era, when courts viewed tribes as quasi-
sovereign states, tribal sovereign immunity might have been neces-
sary to protect the tribes from "encroachment by the states."'
Today, tribal sovereign immunity sometimes has a perverse use:
thwarting the legitimate tort claims of non-Indians harmed by In-
dian products and services.88 In the present day, Indian tribes
provide valuable products and services to American consumers,
including, inter alia, ski resorts, gambling enterprises, and tobacco
sales. 9 Thus, "[i]n [the] economic context, immunity can harm
81. See id.
82. Kiowa 7ibe, 523 U.S. at 757.
83. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 770 (1997) (SouterJ., concurring).
84. Id.
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those who are unaware that they are dealing with a tribe, who do
not know of tribal immunity, or who have no choice in the matter,
as in the case of tort victims."" Even though tribal sovereign im-
munity has exceeded its purpose, it does not necessarily mean that
tribes are no longer in need of protection from encroachment by
states; instead the point is that tribal immunity should be limited
only to encroachment cases, and should not be a tool for tribes to
assert to escape liability stemming from their own positively-
initiated external commercial dealings or lobbying activities. 9'
Tribal sovereign immunity also exceeds its original purposes
when it is applied to activities bearing no meaningful nexus to a
tribe's land or sovereign functions. In Kiowa, Justice Kennedy, by
purportedly deferring to Congress, effectively extended the doc-
trine of tribal sovereign immunity to off-reservation activity, an
expansion which arguably exceeded the original scope of the doc-
trine. 2 Given that the issue in Kiowa Tribe was whether to extend
tribal sovereign immunity to cover off-reservation conduct, the
dissent was loath to do so:
Despite the broad language used in prior cases, it is quite
wrong for the Court to suggest that it is merely following
precedent, for we have simply never considered whether a
tribe is immune from a suit that has no meaningful nexus to
the tribe's land or its sovereign functions.9
3
90. Id.
91. The evolution of sovereign immunity for foreign nations has taken this pragmatic
approach to grants of immunity that courts should also take with respect to tribal sovereign
immunity. See id. at 759. Just as with tribal sovereign immunity, in its early decisions, the
Supreme Court doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity was absolute. Id. However, due to
the sorts of economic harms that Justice Kennedy envisioned in Kiowa Tribe, the State De-
partment, and later Congress were forced to craft a policy limiting the absolute immunity as
created by the Court. Id. This resulted in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which ex-
plicitly codified rules for a commercial exception to the general rule of foreign sovereign
immunity. See id. (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983));
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604,
1605, 1607 (2005)).
92. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 761-62 (Stevens,J., dissenting).Justice Stevens believes
the scope of tribal sovereign immunity should be much more limited. Id. at 760. He rea-
soned that 7iTrner and USF&G dealt with three of the Indian nations comprising the Five
Civilized Tribes, and USF&G was a case in which the federal government was litigating on
behalf of the tribes. Id. at 761-62. A plausible reading of these cases is that they were meant
to apply only to the Five Civilized Tribes, and that the USF&G case only stands for the
proposition that tribal immunity may not be waived when the federal government is litigat-
ing on its behalf. Id. (citing United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940);
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919)).
93. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
FALL 2006]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Extending immunity to off-reservation conduct is not deferen-
tial to Congress because the extension essentially creates a rule that
undermines state power."4 If the Court in fact wished to create rules
that limit state power, it could in theory do so if the rules could be
justified by federal interests, 5 but in Kiowa, the majority failed to
do so."0
Such extension of the doctrine is also unfair because it provides
Indian tribes with broader immunity than that enjoyed by the
states, the federal government, and foreign nations that have vari-
ously given up immunity from either tort liability, commercial
liability, or both. 7 "Governments ... should be held accountable
for their unlawful, injurious conduct."' 8
Tribal sovereign immunity does not apply when compliance with
state regulations is not burdensome for the tribe.: In applying
tribal sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court takes into consid-
eration the extent to which compliance with state regulation
burdens the tribes. '00 In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of
Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the Court held that tribal sovereign immu-
nity does not apply to state taxation of tobacco sales in Indian
country to non-Indian customers.' The Court considered "that
requiring the tribal seller to collect these taxes was a minimal bur-
den justified by the State's interest in assuring the payment of these
concededly lawful taxes. ,
°
1
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity should not be ex-
tended to facts like those of the Agua Caliente case. In Kiowa, Justice
Stevens, in dissent, stressed that courts should not permit tribes to
use tribal sovereign immunity to avoid liabilities stemming from
activities that bear no "meaningful nexus to the tribe's land or its
sovereign functions." 0 3 The Agua Caliente tribe's ability to defy
California's PRA, and to contribute funds to state candidates for
public office, while ignoring its reporting obligations does not af-
fect the tribe's ability to govern itself. Congress' failure to act
should not serve as an excuse for courts to sanction an injustice.
94. Id. at 765.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 765-66.
98. Id.
99. See Okla. Tax Comn'n '. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
512 (1991) (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976)).
See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
100. See Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian 7Tibe, 498 U.S. at 505.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 512.
103. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 764 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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Compliance with the PRA would not be burdensome for the
Agua Caliente tribe. In Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, the
Court found that compliance with state taxes on cigarettes was not
burdensome in relation to the state's interest in collecting the
taxes. 0 4 Reporting campaign contributions is even less burdensome
than collecting taxes, because reporting contributions does not
involve pooling funds and making payments the way that tax col-
lection does. Furthermore, a state's interest in protecting its
political system from corruption is sufficiendy compelling to justify
the minimal burden on the tribe.
0 5
The alternatives to a state's enforcement of regulations like the
PRA against tribes include negotiating agreements with tribes or
seeking legislation from Congress.'0 " But these alternatives are not
realistic.'17 Absent the threat of a lawsuit, there is no incentive for a
tribe to comply with campaign finance reporting requirements.
' °0
Tribal compliance is necessary because donees under statutes like
the PRA must also report their donations.'°9 Tribal disclosure would
not merely be a duplication of effort."" Statutes like the PRA re-
quire disclosure by both the payor and the payee as a check to
discourage omissions by one or the other."'
Tribal sovereign immunity should not bar states from enforcing
statutes like the PRA against Indian tribes through suit. Tribal sov-
ereign immunity is merely a common law doctrine, which stands in
contrast with states' rights under the Constitution to a republican
form of government free from corruption, discussed in the next
section. As such, the right of states to sue to enforce statutes like
the PRA is essential."
2
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION SHOULD NOT BAR ENFORCEMENT
OF STATUTES LIKE THE PRA
If tribal sovereign immunity can be overcome, a regulating state
faces an additional obstacle to enforcing its regulations in Indian
104. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. at 512.
105. See infra Part III.C.
106. See Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 689-
90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); id. at 695 (Davis,J, dissenting).
107. Id. at 689-90.




112. Id. at 689-90.
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country-federal preemption. Federal preemption is the doctrine
that state governments have no general police power within Indian
country.'" There are important exceptions to this rule.' 4 Federal
preemption involves an analysis under two separate lines of cases.
Section III.A addresses the first line of cases relating to states' abil-
ity to regulate non-Indians in Indian country. Section III.B
addresses the second line of cases relating to the states' ability to
regulate tribes or tribal members in Indian country. Finally, Sec-
tion III.C argues that federal preemption should not apply to
prevent states from enforcing statutes like the PRA.
A. Federal Preemption of State Attempts to Regulate
Non-Indians on Indian Lands
States have a compelling interest in enforcing statutes like the
PRA against non-Indians on tribal lands," 5 because tribes might
depend on professional lobbyists who are non-Indians. For exam-
ple, if a state candidate for political office visits a reservation, and a
non-Indian lobbyist employed by the tribe hands the candidate a
check, states would like to attach liability to that non-Indian lobby-
ist under statutes like the PRA. States should be able to enforce
statutes like the PRA without the application of federal preemp-
tion.
When states seek to regulate non-Indians on tribal lands, the
law requires a balancing of tribal interests versus state interests to
determine jurisdiction."" New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe illus-
trates how courts address this prong of federal preemption."7 The
Court took three important factors into account in applying a "par-
ticularized inquiry": (1) Congress' goal of tribal self-sufficiency,
(2) identification of a function or service the state provides in con-
junction with its desire to regulate, and (3) the off-reservation
effects of the tribal activities in the absence of the state's ability to
regulate in Indian country.'18
113. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
114. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141-45 (1980).
115. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,28-36 (1976).
116. In a pair of nineteenth century cases, United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1881), and Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896), the Supreme Court began creating
exceptions to the rule that state laws can have no force in Indian country. McBratney and
Draper gave the states jurisdiction over cases involving crimes taking place in Indian country
by non-Indians against non-Indians, opening the door into the inquiry into the nature of
the subject matter, and the identity of the parties involved in a case. See Draper, 164 U.S. at
247; McBratney, 104 U.S. at 624.
117. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 (1983).
118. Id. at 333-34, 34142.
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In Mescalero, the State of New Mexico sought to enforce state
hunting and fishing regulations against non-Indians on tribal
lands."' The federal government had provided the Mescalero
Apache tribe substantial funding over the course of several years to
develop resort facilities to attract non-Indians with the intent of
enabling tribal self-sufficiency. 2 Non-Indian hunters and fisher-
men were attracted to the reservation by tribal regulations that
were more liberal than those of New Mexico.12' A non-Indian
hunter could, for example, kill both a buck and a doe on tribal
land, but under New Mexico's regulations, the hunter could only
kill a buck. 22 The state enforced its regulations against hunters as
the hunters drove out of the tribal lands.
23
In deciding whether the New Mexico regulations should be pre-
empted, the Court noted that its "determination does not depend
'on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sover-
eignty, but call [s] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal and tribal interests at stake."1
24
The Court in Mescalero found that New Mexico's regulations
would interfere with Congress' intent to provide for tribal self-
sufficiency.15 Not only had the federal government provided sub-
stantial funding for the development of resort facilities, it also had
provided the tribe with elk, fish, and other wildlife to populate the
tribal lands and stock its lakes for the sole purpose of attracting
non-Indian hunters and fishers.' 26 If the state fixed its own regula-
tions on the same hunters and fishers, it would discourage visits to
the tribal lands for recreation and diminish the tribe's ability to
enjoy the collateral economic benefits. 2 7 The Court found this
state regulation of an Indian tribe was against congressional in-
tent. 2 8 The state also provided no special function or service to the
tribe in conjunction with its desire to regulate activities on tribal
lands. The Court held that "New Mexico does not contribute in
any significant respect to the maintenance of these resources, and
can point to no other 'governmental functions it provides' in
119. Id. at 327-28.
120. Id. at 328.
121. Id. at 329.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 333 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145
(1980)).
125. Id. at 344.
126. Id. at 328.
127. Id. at 341.
128. Id. at 342.
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connection with hunting and fishing on the reservation by non-
members that would justify the assertion of its authority.' 29 Finally,
the Court held that New Mexico could not point to any off-
reservation effects that warranted the state regulation: "Some spe-
cies of game never leave the tribal lands, and the State points to no
specific interest concerning those that occasionally do." 30 The
Court recognized the state stood to lose revenue from the sales of
its hunting and fishing licenses, but the Court felt this loss was de
minimus, and was insufficient to justify the assertion of state regula-
tions in Indian country.131
B. Federal Preemption of State Attempts to Regulate
Indians on Indian Lands
The second facet of preemption analysis addresses the case of
states seeking to regulate Indians on Indian lands. State regulation
of Indians on Indian lands is a much more serious matter than
regulation of non-Indians on Indian land, as it goes further to the
issue of tribal sovereignty.3 2 If states are trying to regulate Indians
on Indian lands, the Mescalero balancing test does not apply.33 The
Court will generally preempt any such laws unless the state can
show "exceptional circumstances" that make the regulation neces-
sary. 134 There are a few cases in which the Court found such
circumstances, and they were indeed exceptional."5
In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Department of Game, the Su-
preme Court found an exceptional circumstance when the State of
Washington regulated the on-reservation fishing activities of tribal
members. 36 In Puyallup, the land at issue did not belong to the
Puyallup tribe, but lay within the reservation boundaries; thus, the
137key issue was externalities, or "off-reservation" effects, of its use.
Members of the Puyallup tribe were extending nets to catch
salmon and other species of fish that swim their way from the open
129. Id. at 342 (citation omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 342-43.
132. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976) (pointing to the possible de-
struction of tribal governments to result "if tribal governments and reservation Indians were
subordinated to the full panoply of civil regulatory powers, including taxation, of state and
local governments.").
133. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 341-43.
134. Id. at 331-32.
135. See Org. Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962) (recounting some of the cases
in which the Court found exceptional circumstances).
136. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1977).
137. Id. at 174-75.
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sea up the Puyallup River to spawn each year.""' Despite the state's
attempts at regulation, the tribe's fishing activities posed a real
threat of extinction to the fish.'
3 9
Rice v. Rehner is a second example of a case in which the Su-
preme Court found an exceptional circumstance allowing a state to
regulate Indians in Indian country.140 Rice involved the State of
California's efforts to impose liquor licensing requirements on a
tribal alcohol merchant who sold principally to non-Indian cus-
tomers. 4' The Court held that the law was not preempted in the
narrow area of liquor licensing because historically there had been
no correlation between Indian sovereignty and liquor merchandis-
ing. 14 The Court noted that historically (as far back as the colonial
period), Indian tribes never had exclusive authority over the liquor
trade in their territory. 43 Thus, the Court found an exceptional
circumstance justifying state regulation in Indian territory, stating
that "It]here can be no doubt that Congress has divested the Indi-
ans of any inherent power to regulate in this area. In the area of
liquor regulation, we find no 'congressional enactments demon-
strating a firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency
and economic development.' ,144
C. State Statutes like the Political Reform Act of 1972 Should
Not Be Preempted by Federal Law
Federal preemption should not prevent states from enforcing
statutes such as the PRA against tribes. At a minimum, injunctive
relief should be made available such that tribes should have to dis-
close contributions. Congress has no power to regulate state
elections, except by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to
the Constitution.' 5 States have a compelling interest in preventing
corruption in their own political spheres.1 6 This state interest doesnot interfere with Indian sovereignty and rights to
138. Id. at 168.
139. Id. at 176.
140. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
141. Id. at 715.
142. Id. at 722-25.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 724 (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143
(1980)).
145. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1915) (striking down Okla-
homa election laws that disenfranchised African-American voters).
146. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,45 (1973).
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self-determination. On the contrary, tribal attempts to corrupt
state political systems create considerable externalities, which over-
come the Mescalero balancing test.
The right to contribute to state political candidates was never an
inherent part of tribal sovereignty, 47 so statutes like the PRA should
not be preempted by federal law. The Supreme Court in Rice held
that California could impose liquor licensing requirements on In-
dians selling liquor on Indian lands because of the off-reservation
effects of liquor sales to primarily non-Indian customers and the
historical non-inherence of liquor regulation by tribes.' 48 Under
the same line of reasoning, the statutes like the PRA should not be
preempted, because the off-reservation effects of Indian non-
compliance are substantial.' 49 It would be entirely unfair to excuse
Indian tribes from compliance with statutes like the PRA when all
other wealthy donors, including corporations and individuals, must
comply.
15 °
Federal or tribal interests could not justifiably preempt a state's
right to regulate tribal contributions to state candidates for politi-
cal office, even where states attempt to regulate Indians' activities
on Indian lands. To block state courts from enforcing state cam-
paign finance regulations would be a dramatic infringement on
state sovereignty.' 5' It might be inappropriate for states to seek
monetary damages from tribes that violate campaign finance regu-
lations, but at least injunctive relief should be available to states so
that they may compel tribes to disclose their campaign contribu-
tions. Federal preemption should not apply to states seeking
injunctive relief because historically, tribes never depended on
flouting state campaign finance laws for their sovereignty, and the
off-reservation effects of tribal non-compliance with the PRA are
substantial.
147. Real Parry in Interest's Opposition Brief on the Merits, supra note 40, at 6.
148. Rehner, 463 U.S. at 733.
149. Real Parry in Interest's Opposition Brief on the Merits, supra note 40, at 6-7.
150. Indeed, the Jack Abramoff scandal has shed national attention on the fundamental
'unfairness of tribes asserting sovereign immunity and related arguments to skirt campaign
finance laws. SeeJeffery H. Birnbaum, A Tribal Loophole for Campaign Gifts, WASH. POST, Feb.
2, 2006, at A19.
151. Real Party in Interest's Opposition Brief on the Merits, supra note 40, at 23 ("It
would be to announce, in effect, that States, through the Commerce Clause, ceded to feder-
ally-recognized Indian tribes power to undermine our shared republican form of
government-unless Congress undertakes affirmatively to guarantee powers reserved by the
Constitution to the States. It would be to announce, in effect, that Congress, by inaction, may
authorize these groups of citizens to deprive their fellow citizens of constitutionally guaran-
teed power to protect our shared elections from actual or threatened corruption.").
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTES SUCH AS THE
POLITICAL REFORM ACT OF 1972
Tribal sovereign immunity and federal preemption should not
be substantial obstacles to enforcement of statutes such as the PRA
in which states seek to regulate the fairness of their own campaign
finance systems. However, an examination of rights enumerated by
the U.S. Constitution further illustrates that states should be free to
enforce statutes like the PRA. Courts have a responsibility to up-
hold the constitutional rights of the states by allowing enforcement
of their campaign finance laws against Indian tribes. While the
Constitution does not confer any rights to Indian tribes, it does
guarantee states the right to regulate their elections through the
"Reserved Powers" clause of the Tenth Amendment. 52 The Guar-
anty Clause also confers the right to regulate elections by granting
states the right to a republican form of government.' 5'
A. The Constitution Does Not Confer Rights to Indian Tribes
The text of the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee rights
to Indian tribes. The rights of Indian tribes are provided by the
federal trust and plenary power doctrines.5 4 These doctrines were
created by the courts and legislatures and enforced by the execu-
tive, but they are not guaranteed under the Constitution. In United
States v. Lara, Justice Thomas noted in his concurring opinion that
"the States (unlike the tribes) are part of a constitutional frame-
work that allocates sovereignty between the State and Federal
Governments .... The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this con-
stitutional order....
Unlike tribes, states have rights under the Constitution. Two key
constitutional provisions guarantee that states should be able to
enforce statutes like the PRA against the tribe: the Tenth Amend-
152. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
153. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
154. See Stephanie Dean, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should the Federal Government Be Able
to Tax Native American Gambling Revenue, 32 COLUM.J.L. Soc. PROBS. 157, 163-64 (1999). An
example of the lack of applicability of the Constitution to Indian tribes outside the scope of
the Indian Commerce Clause is Congress' passing of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25
U.S.C. § 1301 (West 2006), to force tribes to extend constitutional rights to their members.
See also Whitney Kerr, Giving Up the "I": How the National Museum of the American Indian Appro-
priated Tribal Voices, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 421, 421 n.1 (2004).
155. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 218-19 (2004) (Thomas,J., concurring).
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ment and the Guaranty Clause. Parts IV.B and IVC argue that al-
though the Supreme Court has historically not given much
credence to states' rights under the Tenth Amendment and the
Guaranty Clause, recent cases bear out the proposition that this
position is changing, particularly in relation to states' ability to
govern their own elections.
B. States' Rights Under the Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that,
"[t] he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. 1 5 6 The power to regulate state elec-
toral processes has not been "delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by"'57 the states. In fact, the Supreme
Court has deferred to the judgment of the states themselves in this
158area.
Concededly, the Court has historically rendered the Tenth
Amendment virtually moot under its Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence,59 as illustrated by the Court's decision in United States v.
Darby.'6 In a unanimous opinion, the Court wrote:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce "is complete
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowl-
edges no limitations other than are prescribed in the
Constitution." [It] can neither be enlarged nor diminished by
the exercise or non-exercise of state power... Our conclu-
sion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment.' 61
This vision of a strong Commerce Clause has changed over the
course of the last century, however, and the importance of states'
rights under the Tenth Amendment has gained importance in the
eyes of the Court. For example, in New York v. United States, the
Court held that Congress could not, under its Commerce Clause
power, compel states to provide for radioactive waste disposal
within their borders.6 2 The Court stated that "Congress exercises
its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the
156. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
157. Id.
158. SeeGregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
160. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
161. Id. at 114, 123 (citations omitted).
162. NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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Constitution.... [T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a
given instance, reserve power to the States.""'
Furthermore, recent cases demonstrate that the Tenth Amend-
ment's "reserved powers" doctrine applies specifically when states
attempt to regulate their elections. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court
noted:
We [previously] recognized explicitly the States' constitu-
tional power to establish the qualifications for those who
would govern: 'Just as 'the Framers of the Constitution in-
tended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the
Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections,' '[e]ach
State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its offi-
cers and the manner in which they shall be chosen.' Such
power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, already





Courts should follow the reasoning of Ashcroft. the Framers in-
tended the states to retain regulatory power over the manner in
which their political officers are chosen. It is vital that federal
courts consider the Framer's intent when presented with state
conduct of state elections. Given that the Court has recognized
that elections fall exclusively within the purview of states' rights
under the Tenth Amendment, statutes like the PRA should be en-
forceable against Indian tribes.
C. States'Rights Under the Guaranty Clause
The other constitutional source of authority permitting states to
apply statutes like the PRA to Indian tribes is Article IV, Section 4
of the U.S. Constitution, the so-called "Guaranty Clause." It states
that, "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Un-
ion a Republican Form of Government. 1 61 Statutes like the PRA
help states maintain a republican form of government,1 66 and
163. Id. at 156-57.
164. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1991) (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)) (internal citations omitted).
165. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
166. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 81002 (West 2004) (articulating that the purpose of the
PRA is to provide public disclosure to inhibit improper campaign practices and improper
influences on elections).
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therefore the Guaranty Clause compels their enforcement-even
against Indian tribes.
Concededly, the Court has historically not given the Guaranty
Clause much weight. Throughout the Court's history, from Luther
v. Borden1 67 through Baker v. Carr, 6' the Court has held that ques-
tions presented under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, Section 4
are nonjusticiable, political questions, the resolution of which is
properly left to Congress. However, the Court has recognized:
[T]he authority of the people of the States to determine the
qualifications of their most important government officials. It
is an authority that lies at "'the heart of representative gov-
ernment."' It is a power reserved to the States under the
Tenth Amendment and guaranteed them by that provision of
the Constitution under which the United States "guarantee [s]
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment."0
69
Though the Guaranty Clause is seldom considered, courts
should utilize it in cases involving statutes like the PRA because the
guarantee of a republican form of government must necessarily
entail the ability to enforce laws enacted to preserve that republi-
can form of government.70 Without the means to enforce those
laws, Article IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution is "ephemeral.'
7
This result cannot be the intent of the Framers. Just as the "power
to regulate interstate commerce would be 'incomplete without the
authority to render States liable in damages," 7 2 so too would the
guaranteed right to a "Republican Form of Government', 73 be in-
complete without the power to enforce state laws like the PRA.
This right must have an accompanying remedy.
Additionally, the Court has recently suggested that not all Guar-
anty Clause claims are nonjusticable political questions. 1 Up to
167. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
168. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-10 (1962).
169. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (citations omitted).
170. See, e.g., Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Santa Rosa Indian Cmty., 20 Cal. Rptr.
3d 292, 301-302 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]ithout a right to bring suit, the state's constitutional
right to preserve its republican form of government would be 'ephemeral.' .... We there-
fore conclude that resort to ajudicial remedy is essential to secure the state's constitutional
right to guarantee a republican form of government free of corruption. As such, the right to
sue must be given constitutional stature.").
171. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
172. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (quoting Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989)).
173. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
174. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992).
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this point, only individuals have brought actions under the Guar-
anty Clause,'7' and the Supreme Court has not yet been presented
with a state action under the Guaranty Clause. The court in Agua
Caliente chose to adopt the view of Professor Laurence Tribe, who
wrote that the question of whether a state may successfully raise
claims under the Guaranty Clause is not foreclosed.
1 7
6
The states enjoy rights under the U.S. Constitution in the form
of the Tenth Amendment, which empowers them to regulate state
elections, and the Guaranty Clause, which guarantees them a re-
publican form of government. However, the Constitution does not
confer similar rights on Indian tribes. Although the Supreme
Court historically has not given the Tenth Amendment and the
Guaranty Clause much weight, recent cases such as Gregory suggest
that in the realm of state campaign finance laws, such constitu-
tional provisions confer rights on states that trump the federal
common law doctrines that allow Indian tribes to flout state laws.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity is a common law doc-
trine created by the Supreme Court to protect the self-sufficiency
of tribal government and economic activities. In California, the
Agua Caliente tribe's ability to flout the PRA and make otherwise
illegal campaign contributions infringes on California's sover-
eignty, substantially affects the fairness of elections for all, and does
not protect tribal self-sufficiency. Courts should not extend the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity to cover cases like these.
Similarly, federal preemption should not prevent states from en-
forcing statutes such as the PRA against tribes. State efforts to govern
the conduct of their own elections present "exceptional" circum-
stances that should render preemption unnecessary. Because a
tribe's ability to influence the outcome of state elections has never
been a historical element of tribal sovereignty, and because the
off-reservation effects of corruption and the appearance of cor-
ruption are considerable, federal preemption should not apply.
175. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 679, 687-88
(Ct. App. 2004).
176. Id. at 688 (citing I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 910-11
(3d ed. 2000)) ("To be sure, the Supreme Court has never held that the Guarantee Clause
... confers judicially cognizable rights upon individuals... [but) it need not follow from the
unavailability of the Guarantee Clause as a textual source of protection for individuals that
the clause confers no judicially enforceable rights upon states as states. It is, after all, 'to every
State' that the promise of the Guarantee Clause is addressed.").
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Courts should recognize the constitutional rights of states to
govern their own elections and enjoy a republican form of gov-
ernment. Moreover, courts should recognize states' compelling
interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion in their political systems. Finally, courts should recognize that
suits enforcing campaign finance disclosure laws are not barred by
the doctrines of tribal sovereignty immunity or federal preemp-
tion, and that at a minimum, injunctive relief should be available.
